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In September 1945 a boycott of Dutch shipping in Australian waters was called in support of the 
Indonesian declaration of independence at the end of World War II. Inspired by the Atlantic 
Charter, a new decolonised world seemed possible. It was working people of Australia, Indonesia 
and India who co-operated in the boycott and attempt to win freedom not only in Indonesia but also 
in India. This article compares the Australian accounts of the boycott with Indian perspectives, 
found in the records of the Indian Seamen’s Union in Australia and in oral histories of Australian 
activists who supported the Indians in this boycott. This comparison demonstrates that the Indian 
seamen played a substantial role in the practical implementation of the boycott, as it was they, not 
Indonesians or Australians, who were the main body of seamen obstructing the departures of the 
black-banned ships. The article asks why the Indian story has been absent in the Australian 
accounts to date and locates the sources of that marginalisation in the assumptions and stereotypes 
developed over a century of hierarchical and competitive colonial labour practices. The boycott 
which seemed to be about the end of colonialism was nevertheless shaped by and remembered 
within the constraints of that colonialism. 
 
 
Comparative or Transnational?  
 
The boycott of Dutch shipping in Australian waters, called to support the Indonesian declaration of 
independence in August 1945, held for nine months and continued intermittently over four years. It 
delayed 559 vessels including 36 Dutch merchant ships, three Royal Australian Navy vessels and 
two British troopships. The story has been told in Australia as a triumphal account of Australian 
unions breaking out of their old racist limitations as they responded to a call by Indonesian 
nationalists for independence and freedom, for Merdeka!1 Yet the real story is about interactions 
between working people of three emerging nations, Australia, India and Indonesia. Each was 
struggling to decolonise but their relationships were shaped by the continuing effects of 
colonialism.  
 There are benefits to considering labour history comparatively,2 but this study is 
transnational rather than comparative because we need to understand the interactions between these 
groups of working people rather than simply to compare their conditions within their own countries. 
The unfolding events which occurred as they crossed paths and tried to communicate open up 
questions about the meanings of ‘nationalism’ and ‘internationalism’ for working-class people in 
that brief period of hope after the end of World War II, when colonialism seemed to be in its death 
throes but when the horrors of Partition and the bitter polarisations of the Cold War were still barely 
imagined.  
 This article focuses particularly on Indians and Australians in Australia as the first part of a 
broader project into the interactions between the three groups, based on an archive of the Indian 
Seamen’s Union in Australia (ISUiA).3 The Indians played a key role in initiating and sustaining 
this strike, yet their story has been lost from view while the Indonesian role has continued to 
circulate in Australian accounts. Julia Martínez has found a similar anomaly in her study of the 
journal of the Seamen’s Union of Australia (SUA) in the 1920s where, despite the union’s 
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commitment to internationalism, she found a hierarchy of attitudes to seafarers of different races.4 
The following analysis of the 1945 boycott confirms there was a persistent misrepresentation of 
Indian seamen but at the same time it opens insights into the challenges mounted by the Indians 
themselves and by their Australian supporters.  
 
Intersecting Colonial Histories 
 
There are similarities in the histories of Indian and Australian seafarers although they are seldom 
acknowledged in either national historiographies. Each shared a similar experience of isolation 
when actually on board ships, under what remained a feudal and brutal regime of control in which 
individual seamen had little opportunity for collective action.5 They both used non-confrontational 
strategies ranging from individual resistance to collective action on land, usually at home ports, to 
try to manoeuvre for some industrial advantage before they contracted to go into the hostile 
conditions at sea.6 Finally they shared a common experience of union support in their home 
countries. Australian maritime unions, of both seafarers and port workers, were strongly active in 
the 1880s but by the 1920s, like the Indian unions, they were divided and hemmed in with hostile 
legislation. In Australia, these unions regained unity and strength through advantageous legislation 
late in the 1930s. In India, although the two major ports, Bombay and Calcutta, operated with very 
different conventions and practices, by 1928 both had strong seafarers’ unions with rank-and-file 
leadership.7 Both countries therefore entered the war with strengthened maritime unions. The 
conditions of warfare, while endangering many seafarers’ lives, also allowed their unions to become 
stronger still because the wartime dependence of their labour gave them a little leverage to demand 
higher wages to cover war-related dangers.8  
 
Australian Perceptions 
Yet if there were similarities in the internal histories of the maritime workers of these two countries, 
there were few similarities in their colonial histories. Their interactions were, in almost every case, 
hierarchical, competitive or hostile, arising from their divergent relations to their common 
coloniser, Britain, and global colonial economies. This meant that each side carried expectations 
and assumptions into later meetings. Australians, as settlers of European descent strongly 
influenced by Chartism and the emergence of British unionism, assumed that they would improve 
on British working conditions and organisational structures. This was the ‘labour’ variant of settler 
colonialism and it had as distinct a racial border. While Australia was largely dependent on shipping 
from Calcutta early in its colonial period, the rising employment of Indian and Chinese seamen as 
crew in the rapidly expanding steam shipping industry in the later nineteenth century was seen by 
Australian seafarers as direct competition. Indians and Chinese were signed on by the British 
companies at rates and conditions far less advantageous than those which were being offered to 
Australian seamen. A series of contracts known collectively as ‘Asiatic Articles’ had been 
developed since the later eighteenth century aimed partly at limiting the movement of seamen hired 
in Asia so they could not freely enter into or stay in Britain or other ports. From the 1820s these 
articles explicitly restricted wage rates to ensure commercial advantage to the shipping lines and 
from the 1890s they limited the geographic range of employment of ‘lascars’ to the tropical and 
subtropical latitudes, to restrict competition with European seamen.9 Despite various forms of 
challenge, the weight of the colonial governments ensured that these regulations, were very hard to 
shift. In 1922, for example, a prolonged battle by Indian seamen’s unions to improve their 
conditions was defeated when their wages were standardised at 10 per cent to 15 per cent below 
those of the highest rates paid to British seamen.10  
 Australian unions supported Australian-owned shipping companies in arguing for the 
exclusion of non-Australian [mostly British] shipping companies, with their foreign-signed 
‘coloured’ crews, from the coastal and Australia-New Zealand routes, a goal eventually won in the 
Navigation Acts of 1921.11 Burns Philp, an Australian company trading along the Melanesian 
islands and on to Singapore, was allowed an exemption in employing ‘coloured’ labour, but the 
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SUA regarded it with suspicion, maintaining pressure on it to change its practices and cease 
employing ‘Asiatic crews’.12 Australians joined British seafaring unions in blaming Indian seamen 
for the exploitative conditions imposed by British shipping companies and supported by the Raj. 
Both British and Australian unions drew on the distorted use of the Persian-derived term, lascar, 
originally simply a description of the occupation of ordinary seaman. It become a racialised and 
denigratory term for ‘coloured labour’, in particular that of seaman of Indian origin, who were 
characterised as weak, submissive and disinterested in challenging the bosses. Constructed as the 
enemy in the triumphal narrative of Australian maritime union histories, these ‘coloured seamen’ 
were barely noticed as fellow workers with social relationships and industrial interests.13 
 This view of Indian seamen developed in the broader context of Australian awareness of the 
course of British colonialism in India, especially the episodic famines which occurred as this rising 
population faced the economic dislocations when British interventions shifted the economy to cash 
crops and plantations. The colonial management of labour by indenture had developed in the mid-
nineteenth centuries as a substitute for slavery and remained a widely used strategy for controlling 
workers.14 There had been a major campaign against the introduction of indentured Indian labourers 
into New South Wales in the 1840s and the use of indenture for the control of Chinese, Japanese 
and Melanesian workers was so high in the attention of Australian unions that it was specifically 
outlawed in the labour laws of the new Federation after 1901. Australians saw themselves as having 
won the battle against indentured labour, despite its continuation within the pearling industry and in 
the management of Aboriginal children and adults for decades. Yet it was Indian workers who 
carried the lingering opprobrium of indenture into the twentieth century. 
 As steam travel became the major form of transport for touring Europeans, the dazzling 
technology and the increasingly racialised hierarchy of the staffing structure ensured that the many 
passengers were little aware of the non-European crews who worked below decks. The hierarchical 
cultures of empire consolidated that impression, which pervaded the consciousness of Australian 
historians and travel writers, who have failed to see that a major proportion of the international 
shipping crews who passed through Australian ports throughout the twentieth century were 
Indian.15 We can gain a sense of the scale of this employment from the scattered figures in reports 
or inquiries. Indian seamen embarking on all vessels just from Bombay in 1814 and 1816 can be 
conservatively estimated from the British census of the city to have been around 70,000.16 Many 
worked on British lines sailing in the Indian Ocean and these numbers increased after 1860 as the 
trade expanded with the introduction of steam. In 1891, 24,000 Indian seamen were believed to 
make up 10 per cent of all those seamen working on British lines. By 1914 the numbers had risen to 
52,000 Indians who formed 17.5 per cent of all British employed seamen. In the 1937 Census of 
Seamen suggested that the overall labour force had diminished but that the proportion of Indians 
had risen. Nearly 44,000 Indian seamen were said to have been employed on British lines in that 
year, making up over 27 per cent of the seamen working on British lines.17 
 These seamen were almost as invisible to Australian unions as they were to liner passengers. 
Of all the Australian maritime unions, only the syndicalist IWW (International Workers of the 
World), known as the Wobblies, attempted to organise and incorporate these non-European seamen 
into their union.18 Martínez has documented the emergence of some knowledge in the SUA during 
the 1920s of union activity among Indian seamen, a recognition stimulated through ILO 
(International Labour Organisation) contacts. But the SUA concern was usually pragmatic, 
characterising Indians and ‘Asiatic labour’ as a ‘problem’ and demonstrating little of the empathy 
which Martínez argues might underpin a ‘community’ of labour. In general, the Indian unions were 
depicted as immature and in need of Australian tuition and advice rather than the solidarity of 
comradeship. The wharfies or dockside workers, many in small unions which were increasingly 
amalgamated with the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF), had less direct contact with Indian 
seamen and so they continued to have little awareness at all of industrial developments in India19 
The White Australia Policy had by this time effectively isolated Australians including Australian 
unionists and the Left from the political concerns of colonised peoples in the region.  
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Indian Perceptions 
The prejudices which shaped Australian perceptions of their encounters with Indian seamen are 
evident, but what did Indians bring to these encounters? Firstly, experience of political mobilisation 
through unions in India was a strong influence to which seamen’s letters and statements often refer. 
By 1939, the Indian seafarers’ unions were under effective rank-and-file leadership with Ibrahim 
Serang in Bombay and Aftab Ali in Calcutta. As Muslims, both Serang and Ali shared their 
religious and community affiliation with a high proportion of their members, but these unions 
remained culturally-mixed organisations, representing Christian, Sikh, Hindu and Islamic seafarers 
and were organisations which retained a broad syndicalist commitment to a secular and socialist 
view of politics. Their powerful joint advocacy of Indian seamen’s interests at the 1936 ILO 
meeting in Geneva was a critical factor in reuniting the maritime unions which had been divided on 
ideological lines so that by the outbreak of war, the industry had one of the highest degrees of 
unionisation in India.20  
 Balachandran has documented Indian seafarers’ collective assertion to exert control over 
their working conditions long before the unions came into existence. Crews often used the 
withdrawal of their labour from violent or exploitative masters prior to contract, particularly in 
home ports but also in some overseas ports like those in the United Kingdom. Balachandran argues 
that because of their political vulnerability away from home, in colonial conditions, the Indians 
focussed on conflicts over contractual conditions like demands to transfer between ships or between 
ports, where they could defend their actions legally.21 His depiction of a politically aware and 
strategically assertive body of seamen is supported by Tabili’s research on Indian seafarers who had 
become resident in English port communities.22 These tactics can all be traced in the Australian 
events. Martínez identified an important but isolated incident resulting in communication between 
the SUA and Indian sailors. In Melbourne in 1923, Indian seamen walked off a ship to protest a 
transfer they argued was against the terms of their contract. They were jailed, not once but twice 
and received assistance which they had not expected from the SUA in the struggle in which they 
eventually won their demands to be repatriated to India.23 Rather than being the isolated incident it 
appears from the Australian records, however, this example accords exactly with the type of 
strategic, collective action framed in terms of contractual legalities which Balachandran has 
described as being widely used by Indian crews, particularly in the UK. The events in Australia in 
the 1940s were to demonstrate Indian seafarers again taking collective action but this time with 
even more confrontational strategies.  
 Secondly, Indians did not approach Australia as unknown territory. Instead, they had had 
decades of knowledge of the ways in which Australian policies had discriminated racially and 
religiously against Indians and Afghanis. There was a network of print and personal communication 
between Indian communities and the South Asian diaspora of labourers and traders in the United 
Kingdom, South Africa and Australia.24 The discriminatory legislation in both South Africa and 
Australia against Afghanis and Indians had provoked widespread comment in the Indian press from 
the 1890s to the 1920s. Perhaps more importantly for the seafaring communities was the fact that 
much of the settler hostility in Australia was directed at Muslim Afghanis, and so the news about 
Australia had circulated widely along local and popular religious networks particularly in cities like 
Bombay and Calcutta but also in the rural areas from which many indentured and migratory 
labourers, as well as the seamen, had come.25 The seamen thus brought with them a well formed set 
of expectations about Australian attitudes towards them. 
 Finally, although we have as yet less information available on the relations between Indian 
and Indonesian seafarers during the 1940s, there are some indications of the range of interactions 
which may have occurred. Indian seamen had been in increasing contact with Indonesians over the 
previous decades as Indonesians had begun to travel across the Indian Ocean more frequently to 
complete the Hajj pilgrimage.26 Strong religious motivation meant that Indonesians of all classes 
made this journey, sometimes travelling in steerage and even working their passage. Given the high 
proportion of Muslims among Indian seamen, and particularly among members of the seafarers’ 
unions,27 it is likely that militant Indian seamen were far more familiar with Indonesians than they 
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might have been with other South East Asian populations like the predominantly non-Muslim 
Thais. 
 Yet while affiliations generated by Islam may have been bringing Indians and some 
Indonesians closer together in shipboard environments from the 1870s, there were solidifying class 
divisions which were dividing them. Indonesian seamen had been in Australia in significant 
numbers after the fall of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) to Japan. Molly Bondan has explained 
the class tensions between the Indonesian petty officers of the Dutch shipping line, KPM who were 
predominantly Manadonese Christians from Sulewesi and the Javanese who made up the majority 
of Indonesian ordinary seamen and who had set up an Indonesian Seamen’s Union in Australia. 
Both were intensely interested in an end to Dutch colonialism, but they took rather different routes 
in their political interactions with the Dutch.28 Where Indians were employed on KPM lines they 
were invariably in the heavier and non-elite roles. Racialised divisions within the stratified world of 
the ship’s workers were a common experience, as Ewald has described.29 In the eastern Indian 
Ocean, on the lines trading between and around India, Indonesia and Australia, there appear to have 
been very few Indians among the upper strata of the ship’s officers but Indonesians, and particularly 
the Manadonese, were frequently found to be filling the petty officers roles.30  
 
Black Banning Dutch Ships 1945-47 
 
The Story as Australians Have Told It  
The accounts of the key participants in the boycott diverge significantly. The story circulating in 
Australia has been substantially the one told by the Australian unions, which foreground the 
Australian role in decision making and impact. The history of the Seamen’s Union, published in 
1981, defined the issues for Indonesians and Indians as essentially industrial ones like wages and it 
characterised the two groups very differently. The Indonesians were depicted as beginners who 
needed to be instructed by the Australians about how to run a decent campaign and how to be good 
unionists. The Indians were described at best as late-comers to the strike and of only marginal 
importance.31 At worst, they were denigrated as scabs and as ‘a motley crew as lascars’ who 
willingly sailed those Dutch ships which did leave port in early contravention of the bans.32 The 
book assumes that the Indians’ motives were only ever better wages or conditions. A more recent 
account of the strike is in the Waterside Workers’ Federation history, published in 1996. It 
acknowledges the political nature of the boycott for everyone involved but argues that the strike 
was inspired and directed by the Waterside Workers. This was represented as a major shift in 
Australian union attitudes but the Indians and the Indonesians were depicted as marginal players 
who had taken no initiating role in generating this shift.  
 The third analysis has been Rupert Lockwood’s, Black Armada, was written from personal 
recollection and extensive interviews with participants, although not published until 1982. 
Lockwood was a journalist who had a long association with the maritime unions and in 1945 was a 
member of the Communist Party of Australia [CPA]. He spent time with Indians in 1945 and 
acknowledged their presence in the boycott far more than the union histories did. Furthermore, he 
recognised the very strong political motivations as well as the industrial concerns motivating both 
the Indians and Indonesians. Lockwood (and certainly the two union histories) were informed by 
but also shaped by the 1946 film Indonesia Calling made by the Dutch filmmaker Joris Ivens, 
himself member of the Communist Party.33 This film has carried an eye-witness authority because 
looks like documentary yet much of its footage was re-enactment rather than live film of events. It 
requires careful reading because its tight editing and scripted voice-over offer a narrative which is 
often contradicted by the visual record it displays. Both Lockwood and Ivens depict the Indians as 
recently arrived and describe them as if they had been brought to Australia only when needed to 
replace striking Indonesian crews. While Lockwood’s book recognised the substantial contribution 
made by the Indians, it nevertheless placed them in a marginal role in the boycott.  
 
Common Ground 
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All these Australian accounts do agree that the unprecedented Australian response to the Indonesian 
call for support arose from the presence of so many highly politicised Indonesians in exile in 
Australia in the preceding three years. When the Netherlands East Indies [NEI] fell to Japan in 
1942, the Dutch evacuated to Australia but so too did many Indonesian seamen crewing merchant 
vessels and other Indonesians who had served the Dutch administration. The Dutch brought as well 
many long term political prisoners from their internment camps like Tanah Merah, who had 
nationalist convictions and often Communist affiliations. The Australian government negotiated the 
prisoners’ release soon after they arrived and over the remaining years of the war, these politicised 
Indonesians were able to circulate widely among Australians. The resulting friendships allowed 
Australians to gain an unprecedented familiarity with left wing Indonesian opinion.34 This did not 
lead to immediate support from Australians. The Indonesian nationalists remaining in Indonesia 
had, in varying degrees, negotiated with the Japanese and had made clear their hopes for eventual 
national independence. Initially Indonesian seamen arriving in Australia in 1942 had wanted to 
mutiny against all continuing Dutch shipping movements.35 The Australian left was at that time 
committed to support for the Allies, including the Dutch. This severely compromised the 
relationship between the Communist parties in each country and the nationalist decolonisation 
movements. As a consequence, there was no support from the CPA or the Australian left generally 
for the exiled Indonesian seamen in their 1942 plan to mutiny.  
 With the end of World War II, however, it became easier for the CPA and its sympathisers 
to consider acting against the Dutch when the Indonesians in Java declared unilateral independence 
on August 17 1945. Indonesian seamen, particularly in Brisbane, again called for support in 
declaring all Dutch shipping ‘black’ to deny any legitimacy or material support to the expected 
attempt to reimpose Dutch colonial control. Refusing to load ships in port was a common strategy 
used internationally among militant maritime workers. Port Kembla wharfies had refused to load 
the Delfram with pig iron bound for Japan was a well known example in Australia. In 1939 Indian 
seamen in port in England had struck successfully for higher wages early in the war by refusing to 
work on ships being refitted in dock for war duties.36  
 Indonesian crew members walked off Dutch ships in Melbourne and Brisbane on 23 
September 1945, after finding arms on a ship in the Brisbane port.37 The following day, the WWF 
and the SUA announced their support and declared ‘black’ all Dutch ships in Brisbane and 
Melbourne and then later in Sydney and Fremantle.38 The Australian unions received immediate 
support from the New Zealand Seamen’s Union and Waterside Workers Unions, as well as from 
others overseas. Their goals, as recalled in 2007 by Communist Party of Australia (CPA) activist, 
Phyllis Johnson, who was a strong supporter of both Indonesian and Indian seamen, were to refuse 
any cooperation with the Dutch in a blanket ban on all shipping. One prominent example of the 
campaign was a demonstration on the Sydney docks against the British ship the Stirling Castle 
which was carrying Dutch troops to the East Indies. The troops threw rubbish down and hosed the 
demonstrators, who included many Sydney communists like Phyllis her husband Johnno Johnson 
and the young activist, Sylvia Mullins, whose photograph as she was drenched in the strong hose 
spray was widely publicised in what became a symbol of the Australian opposition to the Dutch 
presence.39 The Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) carried the Australian side of this boycott. 
They were the strongest union operating on the wharves at this time and were in alliances with 
many of the smaller unions working on the docks and with the Seamen’s Union members who 
controlled the tugs needed for disembarkation.40 While the boycott was eventually broken by small, 
unaffiliated unions in Sydney, in the first months, it was the wharfies and their allies who were able 
to tie up the ports. 
  
What they could not do was to stop the ships from sailing. The Australian accounts of the boycott, 
such as those in the histories of the Seamen’s Union41 or the Wharfies42 and even the account of 
journalist and activist Rupert Lockwood,43 all recount the campaign as if the black ban on loading 
from the docks was enough to stop the ships sailing. Yet Australian unions could not stop the ships 
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moving because the seamen on board the ships were not in those unions. The ships could only be 
stopped by the crews themselves and most of those seamen were Indians.  
 
The Indian Story  
The Indian story is very different. Firstly they had been largely invisible to Australians over the 
period of colonial structures, with only a little knowledge filtering in through unions like the SUA 
in the 1920s. Secondly, unlike the Indonesians, the Indians in Australia were not highly literate nor 
were they political activists in the sense that the Tanah Merah internees had been. They had not 
therefore been viewed with sympathy as newly exiled allies and so there had been no reason for the 
extensive wartime interchange which had grown around the exiled Indonesians. However, the 
ISUiA archive offers a new way to see into their experiences because it includes union papers, 
minutes, detailed membership records, speeches and letters from the Indian seamen themselves to 
the executive members remaining in Australia.44 The archive confirms that Indian seamen had been 
passing through Australia for a very long time, crewing on all the colonial cargo and passenger 
ships which came into the Australian ports. These Indian seamen, or lascars, had worked on all 
colonial shipping since the late eighteenth century. Between ships, they had been living in long 
established ‘coloured labour pools’ set up in port cities, in places like The Rocks and Pyrmont in 
Sydney, where they were forced to live in overcrowded and insanitary conditions.  
 Sailors were not the only Indians to have an impact in Australia over the war years but it 
was these merchant seamen who were to intervene most directly into Australian political and social 
life.45 Indian seamen in Sydney began talking at least as early as the mid-1930s with Clarrie 
Campbell, an Australian who served in the ANZAC Australian and New Zealand armed forces in 
Gallipoli alongside Indian troops from the north-western states and had begun to build friendships 
with them. He returned to Australia to take part in the anti-conscription campaigns.46 After the war 
he set up some small companies in Sydney as a motor mechanic and eventually as a bitumen 
manufacturer. Campbell became an active member of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), managed 
Ben Chifley’s first electoral campaign and sat on the Federal ALP Executive. He remained a 
confidant of Eddie Ward, the Minister for External Affairs in 1945. He was also a strong supporter 
and close friend of many CPA members, although he was never confirmed, even by Australian 
Security investigators, to have been a member.47 Clarrie had maintained his contacts with Indian 
troops passing through Sydney and then extended this by meeting with Indian seamen, many of 
them Muslims coming from Calcutta Bombay and Goa. Together they established an Australia-
India Association in the mid-1930s with a club operating in Sydney’s Rocks area on the waterfront. 
This ran, rather uncomfortably for reasons of ideology and space, on the uppermost floor of the 
building owned by the Seamen’s Mission a Christian-run institution to aid seamen ‘between 
ships’48  
 Sylvia Mullins and Phyllis Johnson both remember the social club well, having participated 
as volunteers during the later years of the war as members of the Communist Party.49 They were 
each of a younger generation than Clarrie, both from economically struggling and highly politicised 
working-class families in smaller towns, Perth and Kandos near Lithgow respectively, before they 
came to Sydney. They were both fired by an intense commitment to social justice and excited by the 
international perspective which the Communist Party offered to them. The Indian Seamen’s Club 
was one of the fulfilments of that promise Phyllis described how the Indians, as ‘coloured seamen’ 
were segregated on the top floor of the Seamen’s Mission building while the ‘white’ sailors were 
allocated the more accessible and more pleasant lower floor. Yet both women remember how 
relaxed the club was, describing it as a ‘tremendous experience’ to meet seamen from different parts 
of India and of different cultures as they served tea and biscuits, watched the Hindustani films, took 
part in dancing, picnics and discussions. The club became the hub of the campaign to raise money 
to send aid to Bengal in the terrible famine of 1944 and provided a welcoming place for seamen to 
observe prayers. They shared the Iftar meal at the end of each fasting day during Ramadan and to 
celebrate its completion in Eid ul-Fit.50 Just as importantly, the social club also provided 
opportunities for talking over union issues and politics in India. Phyllis and Sylvia each 
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remembered meeting Indonesians, Papuans and Chinese at the Indian social club, and Phyllis is 
adamant in all her initial statements that this was a struggle of the ‘coloured seamen, the coloured 
workers’ with all the national groups participating at all times. Yet Phyllis often restated her view 
that it was the Indians who were there in the greatest numbers and that, as the sailors, they carried 
the strike.51 
 The issues which the Indians were seeking to redress from early in the 1930s included the 
power held over seamen by the ships’ officers and the shipping companies, as well as the specific 
wages and conditions under which Indians had little choice but to work.52 The war brought a new 
set of anomalies, as Australian Government intervention to ensure effective recruitment of merchant 
civilian shipping to contribute to the war effort led to substantial pay rises for all seamen. This had 
put a small amount of bargaining power into the hands of the Indian, Chinese and other seamen in 
their attempts to win improvements in wages and conditions.  
 The Indians, as discussed earlier, had substantial union experience and some had been in the 
thick of the struggles over unionisation in India, as one seaman explained to an Australian reporter:  
 
This is not the first time I have been on strike. During the big strike in Calcutta when the 
Indian Seamen’s Union was first formed I went days without food. They killed some of the 
strikers and ever since then I have been true to Union principles.53 
 
Many Indians were active members of the Indian seafarers’ unions in Bombay or Calcutta at the 
time. Some of them wrote to the key activists, including Aftab Ali, in the Calcutta Union during the 
period of formation of the ISUiA and sought advice about the outcome of specific decisions which 
were being voted on by the Indian unions over these months.54  
 So for the Indians it was logical to open discussions with the SUA, to whom they were 
introduced through Clarrie Campbell, to seek to be brought under the protection of the Australian 
union while they were in Australian waters.55 They were rebuffed because they were ‘foreign 
workers’. The Australians told them that current union policy was to offer support to independent 
unions of ‘foreign’ seamen but to exclude such ‘foreigners’ from the SUA because ‘the union had 
enough to worry about as it was’.56 Like the Chinese who approached the SUA in 1942 and the 
Indonesian exiles and internees at a later date during the war, the Indians were told that they should 
form their own union and the SUA would then support them. This was a difficult enough task for 
the Chinese and Indonesian seamen, but the Chinese had had a substantial resident population of 
Australian Chinese citizens from the early nineteenth century and the Indonesians as exiles were 
resident in Australia at least for the duration of the war, so both took this course. For the Indians it 
was far more difficult because they were not a resident population and, given the White Australia 
policy, they had no possibility of even a few of their members becoming residents. Instead they 
were cycling through Australian ports, resident only for the period when they were ‘between 
ships’.57 In describing the process when the Indians eventually did form a union, in the heat of the 
strike campaign early in November 1945, the NSW Trades and Labour Council criticised them for 
being reluctant to elect ‘their own’ as office bearers, seeking instead to have Australians fill the 
executive positions.58 The SUA history patronisingly used this as evidence of the inexperience and 
timidity of workers it continued to regard as inexperienced and ignorant.59 Yet with only Indian 
officer bearers, the Union would face the damaging effects of a constantly changing group of 
executive officers, which made the Indian attempt to have Australian office bearers seem a sound 
strategy. They declined to form a union in the early years of the war on these grounds and continued 
instead to organise informally and effectively through the networks of individual Australian 
unionists and activists being drawn into the Social Club. 
 It was these networks of informal organisation which allowed Indian seamen to be active in 
supporting the Indonesians within days of the call on 23 September 1945 to halt Dutch shipping. 
Indian leaders were photographed as they met at the NSW Trades Hall with Indonesian activists in 
the first week of October to pledge ‘to continue their support’.60 They agreed with the Indonesians 
that it was a contravention of the recently announced Atlantic Charter to reimpose a colonial 
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administration on an independent nation. They had a strategy for their action, although this was not 
recognised by Australian unions and commentators who accused the Indians of being reluctant to 
join the boycott.61 The Indian strategy was to stay on the ships but to refuse to work on goods 
designed to be sent to Indonesia, a strategy of non-cooperation. They would walk off the boats only 
when the ships appeared to be preparing to leave. This confused the Dutch and delaying their 
attempts to secure replacement crews, as well as deflecting the power of the shipping companies.  
 Under the Indian versions of the Asiatic Articles, the seamen by 1945 were all contracted to 
have a Continuous Discharge Certificate (CDC). This ongoing record of their employment had 
originated in Bombay and in Calcutta as a fairer system to reduce the extortionate control which the 
shipping companies and their agents had had over the recruitment of seafarers.62.63 However the 
Indian CDC, with its ‘Quality of Work’ note, gave the shipping company the opportunity to grade 
the individual seaman on his skills and behaviour while under contract to the company. This placed 
substantial power back in the hands of the companies, who could give an unsatisfactory discharge 
which would then have to be displayed to all future employers if the seaman wanted to authenticate 
their experience and years of service. One of the victories which was said to have been won by 
Indian seamen in 1926 was the Indian Government’s acceptance of the ILO Maritime Session 
decision to delete the ‘Quality of Work’ section.64 However, this section, or the ‘Report of 
Character’ with subsections for ‘Ability’ and for ‘General Conduct’, was still in use well into the 
1950s.65 The enormous power over Indian seamen which this placed in the hands of British and 
other international shipping companies was fully supported by the British government. The 
Australian seamen, who might have faced severe problems once they were under contract and at 
sea, were not directly subject to a CDC although there were some other forms of policing which the 
companies could invoke. In this strike however Australian seamen were not exposed at all because 
they did not have jobs on these ships. Land-based workers like the wharfies were even less at risk, 
having some minimal state protection and a strong union behind them by this stage. Only the 
Indians were faced with the extreme vulnerability of the CDCs yet their problem was not 
recognised by Australian unions at the time nor was it acknowledged anywhere in the Australian 
literature on the boycott. 
 This early photograph of the Indians meeting with the Indonesians is important in other 
ways as it suggests the relationships which were being created with the Indonesians by Indians who 
had begun reaching out to challenge the class and racial divisions fostered by the colonial shipping 
companies. This speech made by the Indians at a formal dinner they hosted for the Indonesians 
suggests the relationships being explored underneath the formal language:  
 
In the past there have been small conflicts between Indian and Indonesian seamen … We 
know now that in spite of the urgency of winning the war, certain shipping companies in 
their greed for profits, and even at the risk of losing the war, were prepared to use the people 
of one country against another. But the unity of our people, the people of two important 
countries, must ensure our ultimate emancipation.66  
 
The sense of common goals, between Indians, Indonesians and Australians, was made explicit again 
a few months later in a speech by Mohamed T. Hussain at a dinner in January 1946, hosted by the 
Indians, in which he thanked Australian unionists who had been close supporters:  
 
for assisting us in playing some part in defeating the Dutch in the killing of Indonesians in 
their struggle for freedom. The winning of freedom in Indonesia will surely be followed by 
the freedom of India. For that reason we must do everything possible to see that the Dutch 
are driven out of Indonesia.67 
 
Finally the photograph of that early October 1945 meeting gives a visual clue to who these Indian 
seamen were. The two Indians are Ligorio de Costa, a Goan, and Abdul Rehman, an Indian from 
Poona City just outside Bombay who later became President of the ISUiA. The final participant is 
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Clarrie Campbell, standing on the right of the group. Rehman (whose name suggests his Muslim 
religion) and De Costa (who was, like most from Goa, of mixed Portugese and Indian descent and  
Catholic) were representative of two of the major groups among the Indian seamen in Australia, as 
became evident once membership details for the new union began to be gathered in November.  
 During those early October weeks Rehman and de Costa were joined by Dasrath Singh, 
whose name suggests an origin in north-western India as either a Sikh or a Hindu. We know little 
about Singh before his time in Sydney beyond his employment in the catering department of a KPM 
liner and that, as a seaman ‘between ships’, he had been visiting the Social Club for some time. 
‘Danny’ Singh, as he was known to Australians, was an astute, charismatic activist and a gifted 
interpreter, who became Union secretary and was highly effective as an organiser in galvanising its 
members. Phyllis Johnson recalls him to have been a small but very active man who burst into ‘the 
black section of the Seamen’s Mission’ around 10pm one evening early in October, just days after 
the Indonesians had called for a general boycott. Singh had three seamen from the Japara with him 
and he came with an message the Australians had not heard before, urging Clarrie Campbell, 
Barney Smith from the Seamen’s Union and the Johnsons to help him to take urgent action. Phyllis 
remembers him to have said:  
 
There’s a ship at Ball’s Head [one of the North Sydney docks]. There are Indian seamen on 
it and the Dutch are loading munitions! The Indian seamen are very concerned about it but 
they don’t know what to do. We’ve got to get those men off!  
 
Phyllis and Johnno went across the harbour with Danny to Ball’s Head, where Phyllis stayed on the 
dock, waiting for hours, hunched on the pier:  
 
Johnno went onto the ship with Danny and it took a long time … because the Indians had to 
be sure … that Johnno was fair dinkum. And John said, ‘My wife is sitting on the wharf in 
the rain waiting for you to come off!’ And it WAS raining I can tell you! Well, we got them 
all off … they came up with their prayer mats and they had very very little, but they were 
the first seamen to walk off [in Sydney] and they were all Indian, all of them!68 
 
This was a grave step for the Indian sailors. Despite the one precedent of resisting transfer in 
Melbourne in 1923, they had usually taken such direct action only in the United Kingdom where 
there was a substantial resident South Asian population to support them.69 In Australia the seamen 
were risking everything and needed clear assurances that they would be supported financially and 
politically.  
 This was the first time Australian activists became aware of an episode of loading guns and 
bullets onto commercial cargo vessels in Sydney ports. The earlier example had been in Brisbane 
late in September 1945,70 but there had been no further proof that the Dutch had continued to load 
weapons. Campbell credited Singh with: 
 
taking the first active steps to warn the Australian Trades Unions of the impending Dutch 
plans of running their boats from Australia to Java with munitions of war to be used against 
the Indonesian people in their fight for Independence.71  
 
Lockwood recounted how the Indian warning caught the Australians off guard: they had not 
expected the Indians to take part in the strike and they had not, realised that weapons had already 
been loaded in Sydney by Australian unionists and Dutch scab labour.72  
 The Dutch merchant ships lying loaded, repaired, fuelled and ready to depart by this time 
included not only the Japara but also the General Verspijck, the El Liberatador, the Patras, and the 
Schwartenhondt. The Indians on a number of these ships were now working under duress as Dutch 
troops had been boarded to take up the work left undone by striking waterside workers and also to 
ensure the crews sailed. On both the General Vespijck and the Patras, those Indians who remained 
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on board were known to be working at gunpoint as they reluctantly went about daily maintenance as 
the Dutch troops continued the strikebreaking work of preparing the ships for departure.  
 Since the Indonesian declaration of Independence, the Australian Left and the Indonesians 
had been campaigning strongly for repatriation of all striking Indonesian seamen. From the group of 
previously interned Indonesians, many were also seeking repatriation to independent Republican-
held areas. Most left Sydney on the Esperance Bay on 13 October, eventually reaching Indonesia 
safely to allow them to rejoin the nationalist struggle for Independence. Virtually all of the striking 
seamen and many Indonesian political activists left Australia at this time.73 The only substantial 
body of people remaining to crew the Dutch ships were therefore the Indians.74  
 As the Dutch became increasingly concerned about manning their merchant fleet, they 
looked for replacement crews from two sources, both related to the British. They firstly approached 
other shipping lines in Australia who ‘owned’ ‘labour pools’. The Tribune reported75 that the Dutch 
had turned to the Australian shipping company Burns Philp, a cargo line operating through 
Melanesia and the Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean and exempt in that period from the Australian 
prohibition against ‘Asiatic crews’. The Dutch had ‘borrowed’ the Indians ‘kept’ by Burns Philp in 
their squalid ‘labour pool’, forcing them at gunpoint to work as crewmen on the Japara, which the 
original Indian crew had left on strike. Both the transfer to another shipping company, the transfer 
to vessels whose destination was NOT an Indian one and the transfer to another port were all 
actions contradictory to the Indian articles of agreement under which Indians were contracted and 
were precisely the circumstances to which Indians had developed strategic opposition in the past in 
the United Kingdom and in Australia.76 The second source of labour was British India itself, and the 
Dutch received the active cooperation of the British colonial administration to recruit seamen in 
Bombay. The timing of the arrival and forced mobilisation of these replacement Indian crews was 
not well recorded in the early boycott, but it is clear that they had not been informed about the 
political role they would be fulfilling by sailing on the Dutch ships.  
 On 20 October, the Dutch attempted to sail the Patras out of Sydney, with Dutch guns 
trained on the Indian engine crew, Dutch strike breakers and some of these newly arrived Indian 
seamen to replace the striking Indian deckhands. An extraordinary chase down Sydney Harbour 
ensued in which a small launch driven at high speed by Australian unionists like Barney Smith 
(Seamen’s Union) with Dasrath Singh and other Indian seamen pursued the large Dutch cargo ship. 
From the launch, Singh addressed the crew by megaphone in Urdu or Hindi. He explained the 
Dutch attempt to re-arm their colonial forces in Indonesia and argued the case for joining the strike 
to the receptive crew, but the presence of Dutch troops made it impossible to intervene further and 
the ship steamed out of the heads. Yet within hours it had limped humiliated back into port. As the 
Indian crew poured over the sides into waiting launches, they described how they had taken the 
dramatic, confrontational decision to refuse to stoke the engines. The Indians had agreed to go back 
to work only if the ship returned to port, leaving the Dutch little option but to comply.77 The case of 
the General Vespijck was similar, where armed Dutch guards formed an intimidating presence when 
Singh and others stood off the boat’s stern and addressed the crew. Here too the Indian crew 
members decided on direct confrontation, letting the steam down in the ship’s engines, and then 
leaving the ship spectacularly en masse in lifeboats lowered over the side. They argued they would 
not carry armaments ‘for use against their “Indonesian brothers”’.78  
 Only the Indian activists could have achieved these results. There appear to have been no 
language skills at all amongst the Australian organisers. Neither Clarrie Campbell nor Australian 
maritime unionists spoke Hindi, Urdu, Goanese or Bengali, the major languages of the Indian 
seamen. The only people who could do this negotiating were the Indian organisers.  
 There is a strange, inverted glimpse at this process when we look at the film Indonesia 
Calling. The film was shot by re-enacting events which had taken place just a few weeks before. It 
used many of the longest resident members of the ISUiA, including Abdul Rehman, Dasrath Singh 
and Clarrie Campbell, along with other Indians who can be seen wearing their ISUiA badges 
prominently. Each of them can be identified from press photographs of the time and have more 
recently been identified by participants in events.79 Yet the parts they were called on to act out 
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(reinforced by the tight editing and voice over) had them appearing to be newly arrived and naïve 
workers who had had to be introduced to the issues for the first time by the Australians and 
Indonesians. This disjunction between the film’s narrative of marginal, naïve Indians compared 
with the visual evidence of high levels of Indian involvement and planning was just one of the 
contemporary causes of widespread confusion about the Indian role in the boycott.  
 The Indian organisers from the ISUiA began visiting the various miserable ‘labour pools’ 
around the port cities, talking to the Indians again in their own languages, mobilising them to resist 
the pressures from their contract employers and from Dutch troops. In the process they drew more 
and more Indian seamen into the strike.80 Dutch alarm increased at the impact the Indian campaign 
was having and although they had no formal jurisdiction in Australia, the presence of Dutch 
security officers became more obvious, seemingly aimed at intimidating the Indian organisers. 
Australian supporters were concerned enough to organise protection for the Indians and on one 
occasion Sylvia Mullins called on her brother Jack to look after Dasrath Singh. On leave from the 
air force, Jack took on the job for four days, calling on another airforce mate, Harry, to help. Jack 
described the scene as he and Harry moved Dasrath Singh from meeting to meeting, with the Dutch 
following them threateningly in a car crawling along the curb.81  
 
And we were shadowed by a couple of big heavy Dutch blokes in a car. I got on the outside, 
then there was Danny and then there was Harry on the inside because he was the short bloke 
– although he’s a good wrestler. And at one stage they pulled up along side us, and one 
started to get out and said, ‘Singh come here’. And I turned around and I said, ‘Piss off. He’s 
not going anywhere with you.’ So they decided they’d better not tackle us. We were in air 
force uniforms. So away they went.’ 
 
The intimidation continued through the four days Jack was on duty,  
 As it became harder to break the bans imposed by Indian seamen on ships leaving the 
Sydney ports, the Dutch began to take the newly imported replacement Indian crews by train from 
their arrival point in Sydney through to other ports. In November, 60 Indian seamen newly landed 
from the British ship Chaibassa were hustled through Sydney’s Central Railway Station to load 
them onto a train for Brisbane where Dutch ships had been left stranded by striking Indian crews. 
Dasrath Singh was there again, supported by a large group of Pathan seamen, all of whom were 
speaking to the replacement crewmen in Urdu or Hindi to explain the black bans which they had 
unknowingly been recruited to break. Dutch guards recognised Singh and called the police who 
intervened violently and ‘punched and manhandled the striking Indian seamen in a forcible attempt 
to prevent them speaking’. Singh was hurled over luggage barrows and knocked to the ground. To 
do this under the clock in the busy main thoroughfare at Central Station opened both the Dutch and 
the Australian police up to horrified gaze of the public, many of whom expressed their distaste for 
both the violence of the police and the arrogance of the armed Dutch guards acting to coerce British 
citizens.82  
 On October 22, most of the Indian crews already on the Dutch ships walked off and by 30 
October they had left the last ship, the Pahud.83 From then on, only newly recruited replacement 
crews were put on to the idle ships, but most of them were contacted by the Indian organisers and, 
ship by ship, they too joined the strike. Campbell estimated that there were over 200 Indians who 
had walked off the boats over October and November while over 1,000 remained on Dutch ships 
but refusing to cooperate on NEI related work.84 The only Indian crews who sailed were those 
being coerced by Dutch troops and even those sailing at gunpoint were prepared to mutiny where 
they knew they had support on shore.  
 By now, a substantial body of Indian strikers were in open dispute with the contracting 
shipping companies and so were in urgent need of accommodation and board. The Indian seamen 
began to contribute and, as Campbell recounted in 1946, they ‘subscribed many times more in cash 
than did the whole of the Australian Trades Unions combined’ and ‘sacrificed £20,000 in lost pay’ 
over the period of the strike. The NSW Trades and Labor Council and the Australian maritime 
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unions contributed as well, but it was the Indian seamen who then initiated a campaign to force 
KPM, as the contractor, to fund both board and lodging and repatriation costs. Despite protests from 
the Dutch, on 23 October the Indians moved into the now-empty Lido, a boarding house in North 
Sydney allocated to the Dutch administration by the Australian government during the war to house 
NEI exiles and previously used, against protests from KPM, to house the striking Indonesian 
seamen in preparation for their earlier repatriation. Phyllis Johnson and other volunteers from the 
Social Club continued to help manage the accommodation: ‘Johnno was the providore’, Phyllis 
remembers, ‘and I was the publicity officer!!’ Phyllis with Geoff Wills, another activist, would go 
from worksite to worksite with a megaphone, speaking about the Indonesian cause and explaining 
the stand of the Indian seamen.85  
 The next Indian move was to press further still their campaign for KPM to accept their 
funding responsibilities as contractors. The Indians argued they were prepared to fulfil their side of 
the contract by doing any other appropriate work but they would not crew the ships being used to 
break the Atlantic Charter by carrying arms and direct material aid to re-establish the NEI. They 
launched a series of petitions, appeals and eventually held two major demonstrations against the 
KPM at their Sydney office on 12 and 18 December, at the same time petitioning and sending 
formal deputations to the Indian High Commissioner in Australia (in Sydney and later in Canberra) 
to support the repatriation effort.  
 Their second demonstration on Tuesday 18 December 1945 was an unprecedented event. 
The Indians decided to march from the Lido across the Harbour Bridge to the KPM offices in the 
centre of Sydney’s business district. They were accompanied by a handful of Australian trade 
unionists, including stalwarts like Barney Smith and, as there were no Indonesian seamen remaining 
in Australia, they were joined by a small number of the Indonesian activists from the Indonesian 
sub-committee of the Trades and Labour Council. Supportive Australian unionists who were 
soldiers and airmen accompanied the Indians in uniform. Their march was extraordinary. It was, as 
Rupert Lockwood writes, ‘the first great demonstration of Asians ever seen in the streets of 
Sydney’. This was so powerful an event in the minds of the trade union participants that it was re-
enacted for Indonesia Calling.86 After occupying the KPM offices for the second time, and 
delivering an ultimatum, they moved to occupy the offices of the Indian High Commissioner in 
Margaret Street, again accompanied by unionist supporters, including S. Moran from the Sydney 
WWF. He estimated there were many hundreds of Indians involved in the demonstration. Moran 
described this peaceful occupation as involving precisely the non-cooperation tactics made famous 
in Gandhian campaigns in South Africa and India. The first rows of Indian seamen sat or squatted 
on the floor, only to be carried off by the NSW police who then returned to find that the 
demonstrators’ places had been promptly taken by another set of Indians. The process was repeated 
till the High Commissioner accepted the ten demands the Indian unionists placed before him.87  
 Ultimately the Indians won a capitulation by KPM on the funding issues88 although the 
implementation of repatriation, the compensation for KPM failure to fulfil contracts and the 
discharge arrangements for Indian seamen proved to be deeply discriminatory and retaliatory.89 The 
Indian High Commissioner proved that his loyalties lay at least in part with the British, agreeing to 
block the recruitment of further replacement crews in Bombay but failed to stop reprisals being 
against Indian seamen in the repatriation and discharge process by the Dutch shipping company.90 
 The Indians did finally form a union in November 1945 and their documentation allows us a 
rich insight into history of the Indians in Australia. Analysis is continuing in collaboration with 
Indian historians to learn more about the 922 men who joined the union over its brief life, from 
1945 to 1949. Already it is clear that the membership lists show a significant participation of 
Muslims (from the areas which were to become Pakistan and Bangladesh) as well as the presence of 
Goans and some Sikhs and Hindus. The presence of Muslims was important in terms of the political 
motivations for the Indian involvement in the boycott. Shared Islamic faith was a major motivating 
factor in the solidarity between the Indian seamen and the Indonesians. The Indians pointed out its 
importance on a number of occasions and in an interview on 30 October 1945, one Indian 
spokesman saying:  
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The Indonesians are 98% Mohammedan and the Indian seamen in Sydney are 98% 
Mohammedans. Thus the shipping companies are trying to force us to take part in a war on 
our brother Mohammedans. This is against our conscience, as well as being against the 
law.91 
 
 Yet despite the significant role of the Indians in the success of the boycott, Australian 
unionists continued to ignore their presence and their initiative. The most striking example was the 
failure by the WWF to include the Indian Seamen’s Union in Australia in its high profile Hands Off 
Indonesia rally in Sydney in April 1946. The Australian union simply ignored the Indian Seamen’s 
Union, which was not invited to speak or attend the rally despite their major role in the strike’s 
implementation and success.  
 Campbell wrote an icy letter of protest to the general secretaries of the WWF, NSW and 
Federal, the Federal Ironworkers Union, the Federal Seamen’s Union, the ALP (Stan Sharkey) and 
the Indonesian Seamen’s Union,92 in which he pointed out:  
 
The withholding of Dutch ships could not have been successful without the cooperation of 
the Indian seamen. Every Dutch ship left by Indians had been previously repaired, stored, 
cargoed, coaled, tugged and piloted by Australian Unions, and were only held up at the last 
moment by the Indians spontaneously leaving these ships.  
 
Throughout the Campaign, the Indian seamen have played an outstanding part. They led the 
demonstrations in each case against the Dutch shipping company, they subscribed many 
times more cash than did the whole of the Australian Trades Unions combined. They 
sacrificed 20,000 in wages and willingly saw their families starve in India rather than assist 
the Dutch to suppress the Indonesian Republic …  
 
The Indian seamen do not regret the sacrifices they have made in the common struggle, on 
the contrary, they take pride in being in the vanguard of such an important event in worlds 
history, but they do strongly object to their conscious or unconscious exclusion at such 
demonstrations as this Town Hall rally when an opportunity could have been afforded them 
to meet progressive Australians. …. 
 
 Trusting that in future more consideration will be given to those who have and who are 
destined to play such an important part in the freedom of the Colonial peoples …  
 
The Indonesian Seamen’s Union scrambled to apologise to the ISUiA over the blunder, its President 
M.H.L. Mailangkay, explaining that the WWF had organised the rally without consulting them 
either. The Indonesians, Mailangkay went on to assure the Indians, were making urgent 
representations to correct the omission of people they regarded as playing such ‘a heroic part in our 
common struggle’.93  
 The SUA took Campbell’s letter deeply to heart. Its newsletter, the Seamen’s Journal 
published large sections of Campbell’s letter although it did not explain the context in which the 
letter had been written.94 It is not yet clear whether Campbell’s angry representations on behalf of 
the Indians were eventually enough to have them invited to be at this rally. 
 Yet it was not only unions and working people who harboured a deep-seated reluctance to 
recognise the role of the Indians in the boycott and the broader politics of decolonisation. Over this 
period the ALP government was increasingly concerned at the tensions between the Communist 
party and the ALP and there were deep suspicions held by all the federal ministers over the 
directions of future relations. It was at this time that the ALP brought in its internal rules 
disallowing CPA members or affiliates from taking active roles in party processes. The British 
government and military were exerting increasing pressure to break the bans on the movement of 
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Dutch shipping as the British were in charge of managing the disarmament of the Japanese in the 
South East Asian region, and needed as many ships as possible both to repatriate Allied Prisoners of 
War and to re-establish Dutch control in a stable administration in Indonesia. British pressure was 
applied to the Federal Government and Attorney General Bert Evatt was particularly sympathetic. 
He had favoured sending Australian troops into Indonesia to support the Dutch re-entry and was 
active in challenging left-wing union influence over foreign affairs. The Government influenced 
some unions to swing debate in the Australian Council of Trades Unions (ACTU) and the State 
Trades and Labour Councils (TLC) to have the bans lifted. There were a series of meetings and 
increasingly tense debates with the upshot that late in January 1946 the NSW TLC and the ACTU 
had voted to suspend the bans with a trial ‘relief’ ship. Indian strikers and their union were not 
consulted, or informed of the decision, learning about it from a news report. The Indian Seamen’s 
Union wrote a bitter letter of protest but they were confronting a deep seated prejudice which Bert 
Evatt himself revealed in a back-room meeting. Clarrie Campbell wrote about it in a letter to Phyllis 
and Johnno Johnson:  
 
I elbowed myself into the ACTU as a co-opted member, and each time, they were ready to 
vote for a trial ship I threw a spanner in the works that has on each occasion brought about 
the rejection of a ship.  
 
On one occasion, a committee was appointed to wait on Evatt and I was included: Evatt 
without any provocation, said ‘All Indians were scabs!’ Guess what I said? Yesterday, the 
ACTU met again but I was not invited, so I don’t know what happened.95 
 
Reflections on a Strike  
 
The boycott was effectively broken in July 1946, when the uneasy leadership of the NSW Trades 
and Labour Council were able to prevail on a small union which bunkered ships in Sydney Harbour 
with coal and was not yet affiliated to the WWF. With Dutch troops and volunteers stoking the 
engines, KPM was able to slip its remaining ships out of the harbour to rendezvous points off shore 
where the Netherlands had organised larger ships to resupply and recrew the boats.96 While further 
demonstrations and token black bans protesting Dutch ‘Police Actions’ in Indonesia continued to be 
imposed until Independence in 1949, the most urgent pressure was lifted from the Indian seamen 
once the last Dutch ships left Australian waters.  
 By mid-1946, the Indian Seamen’s Union in Australia was assessing the impacts on its 
members. The outcomes were significantly different and far more severe for the Indians than they 
were for the Australian trade unionists, although the fallout from the boycott was momentous 
enough within Australia. Most of the Indian activists were deported when the main body of striking 
Indian crewmen were repatriated in a series of ships leaving from January to March 1946. When 
they reached their homes in India, they began collecting their Continuous Discharge Certificates, 
only to find that KPM and the other shipping companies had marked their ‘Report of Character’ 
section with DESERTER, a label which ensured they were unlikely to work again in any 
comparable position.97 The story of the struggle to challenge these bad discharges and to gain 
recognition for the strikers among the emerging leaders of independent India will be the subject of 
another strand of this project. Yet the grave difficulties faced by the Indians were of little interest 
among unions in Australia. Although the ISUiA tried to organise support from the Australian 
government and the union movement, there was little effective action.  
 The Indian role in the boycotts was lost to view for three reasons. It was perhaps in small 
part because of the confusion arising from Australian ignorance of the non-European countries of 
the Indian Ocean and Asia, an ignorance which was exacerbated by the media of the day which 
frequently confused one Asian seaman with another and homogenised all the strikers as 
‘Indonesian’. Largely however, the story was lost because of the perpetuation of differential racial 
stereotyping not only within the general white Australian population but within the culture of the 
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left and labour movements. The unionists, politicians and activists involved in the boycotts simply 
did not expect the Indians to be politicised, to be unionised, to be acting in strategic support of their 
sense of cultural and religious affiliation or even to be articulate about their goals. They were not 
expecting to learn from or share ideas and strategies with the Indians. There were some outstanding 
exceptions among the Australians, but most failed to seize the opportunity to engage with the 
Indians as a complex political community, grappling with many of the same issues faced by the 
Australian workers themselves. The Australian assumption that Indians were only reacting to urging 
from Australians trade unionists is evident throughout the trade union histories and was everywhere 
demonstrated in the contemporary press and union statements. Yet the Indian seamen took 
opportunities to explain their motives, their strategies and their goals. While differing languages 
clearly posed a significant barrier, there were strong and clear statements in English which should 
have elicited recognition. 
 Finally, the events of history caught up with the individuals involved, removing from the 
scene of active politics those who might have told the story differently. Many of the Indians were 
excluded from the international shipping trade because of their bad discharges, thus severely 
restricting their future employment but also their union activity. Ironically, their greatest challenge 
turned out to be the achievement of the very goal, Independence, for which so many of them had 
struggled. When Independence did finally come in 1947, it was accompanied by Partition, which by 
dividing the areas of high seamen’s recruitment in West and East Pakistan from India, also severed 
the links between many of seafarers who had joined the ISUiA in Australia in 1945. Most were 
Muslims but their homes lay on different sides of what became the borders of India and Pakistan. 
Of the Indonesians who had been in Australia, while many had returned to become part of the left 
wing of the nationalist struggle for independence inside Indonesia, some of those who had been 
closest to the Australians were lost in the conflicts within the movement which led to the execution 
of many members of the left at Madiun in 1948 and then later in 1965. The Australians who had 
supported the Indians were few in number and were soon scattered. Barney Smith was killed in a 
car accident and Clarrie Campbell was drawn increasingly into the attempts to set up trade links 
with Republican Indonesia, moving to Singapore to further this goal by 1948. The pressures of the 
Cold War generated isolation and paranoia, separating old comrades even more effectively than 
distance and borders might have done. By 1950, the divisive effects of the Cold War had overturned 
the government in Australia, split the Labor Party and driven the left into defensive isolation.  
 The boycott had indeed been a high point in Australian unionism. It was extremely 
important in offering an example of the power of solidarity and of the common interests between 
decolonising people across the region. It allowed an unprecedented sense of collaboration across 
racial and cultural lines. So it is rightly celebrated, but it is more complex than the Australian union 
histories would have us believe. This strike tells us not only about some Australians opening their 
doors and their political affinities to the decolonisation movement. It is also an example of how 
many Australians found it very difficult to listen to the working people of neighbouring countries 
when they were arguing, not only for industrial justice but for independence and political freedom.  
 The opportunity had been offered for so much more, something perhaps much closer to the 
‘community of labour’ which might have been the promise of internationalism.98 Clarrie Campbell 
gave a glimpse of the possibilities when he pleaded with the Indian High Commissioner in Australia 
in July 1946 to help expunge the ‘Deserter’ stamp from the discharge papers of the strikers.99 
Campbell revealed his own debt of gratitude, his shared commitment to the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter and his warm admiration for the Indians with whom he’d worked when he wrote 
them a tribute which should echo down the years:  
 
they put into practice a desire that is burning within the hearts of hundreds of millions of 
their countrymen: Freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, freedom 
of religion and freedom to determine their own way of life. 
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